Aftermath of the June SISS Hearing

"Nobel Winner Defies Probers," Baltimore Sun, June 22, 1960.

[Part 5 of 5]

Shortly after his first appearance before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Linus Pauling’s counsel succeeded in postponing the scheduled follow-up hearing from August to October, 1960. The extra time gave Pauling room to plan for his upcoming defense, and to resume plans he had made before being served with the SISS subpoena.

In due course, he attended rallies and events to which he had previously been committed, making sure to discuss his dispute with Senator Thomas Dodd whenever a chance presented itself. He also encouraged people to write to their representatives in protest of his treatment, and gave many critical interviews to the media. Pauling was gaining popular support, evident in part from the positive mention he received in editorials and letters to the editor across the country, including this write-up in the Washington Post.

Justice is best served at times by those who defy authority. Prof. Linus Pauling offered a splendid illustration of the point, we think, when he refused the other day to give the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the names of persons who had helped him circulate a petition in favor of the abandonment of nuclear weapons tests.

Pauling felt that he had been subjected to a great injustice. Though he had remained calm and civil during the questioning, his anger took little time to surface after the encounter. He resented the hearing in a general sense, and was particularly embittered by a few particular aspects of the experience. He took his time reading over the hearing transcripts, slowly digesting the implications of the Subcommittee’s line of questioning. After combing through his testimony, Pauling wrote a letter to the SISS that was eventually attached to his testimony, and thus made part of the public record. The letter expressed his sense of victimization, detailing six specific points from the Subcommittee questioning that he found to be exceptionally inappropriate.

Pauling took special offense to the title that was given to his hearing, “Communist Infiltration and Use of Pressure Groups,” a decision by the Subcommittee that seemed particularly baleful and malfeasant. Pauling emphasized that the Subcommittee had both no substantive reason to suspect that he was involved with communism or communist conspiracy, and that no new evidence connecting him to communist activity was revealed by the end of the hearing.

Another criticism that Pauling listed was a question posed by the Subcommittee, which suggested that he had omitted Soviet signatures from the United Nations Bomb Test Petition when it was released to the press. The Subcommittee had in fact obtained a complete copy of the petition, which included the Soviet signatures, three months prior to the hearing. Pauling considered these three months ample time to clarify such an obvious error well before his questioning, and made his perception of the matter explicit:

Damage was done to me by your false statement and by my having been questioned on the basis of your false statement. No matter whether the false statement was made (by your Chief Counsel) through gross carelessness or through malignancy, I protest this action.

A similar point of contention involved a letter that the Subcommittee introduced into the record, which it had received from a staff member of the United Nations. It stated that while Pauling had listed a certain number of petition signatures in his original press release, the United Nations had only received a portion of that number – an error that, as it turned out, was attributable to the UN. Though the staff member’s mistake was eventually clarified for the record, Pauling was later informed that the Subcommittee had been previously aware of the error. Indeed, a complete and accurate list of the names, matching those specified in Pauling’s press release, had been in front of the Subcommittee during the hearing. Pauling accused the Subcommittee members of intentionally entering the untrue statement into the record in order to damage him, by defaming his reputation and casting doubt upon his integrity.

"Opinions Split on Dr. Pauling," Los Angeles Mirror News, July 6, 1960.

Lastly, Pauling addressed the Subcommittee’s threat, by intimation, of imprisonment. During the hearing, a Subcommittee member had asked Pauling if he was familiar or acquainted with Dr. Willard Uphaus. The question was posed after Pauling had displayed a continued reluctance to reveal the list of individuals who had delivered more than one signature to the petition. Pauling answered that he did know of Dr. Uphaus, though he made no open recognition of the question’s implication. Dr. Uphaus was, at the time of the hearing, in jail for a transgression – contempt of court – similar to the one it seemed Pauling was about to commit. Pauling closed his letter to the SISS with a biting critique of the question and its inference:

I consider this veiled threat, this intimation of the fate that awaited me if I did not conform to the demands of the Subcommittee, to be unworthy of the Senate of the United States of America. My respect for Senator [Norris] Cotton would be greater than it now is if he had said straightforwardly that for me to refuse to give the Subcommittee the information demanded by it might lead to my citation for contempt of the Senate and to a prison sentence. I prefer straightforward statements of fact to veiled threats and attempted intimidation. I prefer the forthright search for the truth to the sort of trickery and misrepresentation that in my opinion has been revealed by the proceedings in my hearing before your Subcommittee.

On top of his continued interactions with the press and his efforts to revise the published hearing testimony for the public record, Pauling also took direct legal action after the first hearing. In particular, he sought a declaratory court judgment that would affirm his right to refuse the Subcommittee’s request. In so doing, he was attempting to clarify his position and reduce his risk in the matter, but the District Court and Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia both ruled against him. He appealed and, at the start of his second hearing in October, his case was pending before the US Supreme Court.

Pauling also continued to travel during the interlude between his hearings, visiting London and Geneva, where he furthered the discussion of an atomic test-ban treaty with American, British and Soviet officials. He received a great deal of support during the trip, and the pressure from the hearing, as well as the threat of imprisonment, seemed to lessen as a result.

Though Senator Dodd attempted to address Pauling’s growing campaign against the Subcommittee, increasing his rate of public retaliation as the second hearing date grew closer, he found that he could not match Pauling’s intensity and drive. Recognizing the seriousness of the situation, Pauling was trying very hard to avoid jail time. At the same time, he was defending his reputation (and thus his very livelihood) as a scientist, academic and activist. Dodd’s political gambit for an increased share of national spotlight, however much buttressed by honest concerns about communist subversion, was no match for Pauling’s grasp of the situation’s severity.

As the second hearing drew closer, Pauling’s resolve continued to strengthen. Pauling’s supporters, on the other hand, remained anxious, as the outcome of his fate, which lay at the discretion of Senator Dodd and the SISS, remained elusive.

The June Hearing, Part 2: Pauling Makes His Stand

Peace News, July 22, 1960

[Part 4 of 5]

When his June hearing before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was resumed two and a half hours later, Linus Pauling agreed to submit a list of the individuals that he had sent petition requests to, but refused to submit a list of those who returned more than one signature. In making this stand before the Senators, he spoke eloquently to the necessity of his decision and explained his refusal of the Subcommittee’s request.

The circulating of petitions is an important part of our democratic process. If it were to be abolished or greatly inhibited, our nation would have made a step toward deterioration – perhaps toward a state dictatorship, a police state.

I am very much interested in our nation, in the United States of America, and in the procedures that were set up in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Now, no matter what assurances this subcommittee might give me about the use of the names of the people who circulated the petition that I wrote, I am convinced that these names would be used for reprisals against these believers in the democratic process, these enthusiastic, idealistic, high-minded workers for peace. I am convinced of this because I myself have experienced the period of McCarthyism and to some extent have suffered from it, in ways that I shall not mention. I am convinced of it because I have observed the workings of the committee on Un-American Activities of the House of Representatives and of this Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. I feel that if these names were to be given to this subcommittee the hope for peace in the world would be dealt a severe blow. Our nation is in great danger now, greater danger than ever before….This danger, the danger of destruction in a nuclear war, would become even greater than it is now if the work for peace in the world, peace and international law and international agreements, were hampered.

A terrible attack is being made now in the United States on the efforts of our government to achieve international agreements for stopping the bomb tests and for disarmament. This attack is being made by representatives of defense industries who benefit financially from the Cold War….I believe that the work for peace and morality and justice in the world needs to be intensified now, and I plan to do whatever I can in working for peace in the world, working for international agreements about disarmament.

Though his counsel supported his position on constitutional grounds, Pauling justified his defiance “as a matter of conscience, as a matter of morality, as a matter of justice.”

"Dr. Pauling Refuses Senators' Demand for Names of A-Ban Group", The Philadelphia Inquirer, June 22, 1960.

Upon hearing his decision, and giving Pauling another chance to comply, subcommittee chair Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated his disapproval of Pauling’s decision and his dissenting opinion of Pauling’s objection. After the other senators voiced similar displeasure at Pauling’s misgivings towards the Subcommittee, he was ordered to appear again at the New Senate Office Building in less than two months time. Pauling was again directed by Senator Dodd to bring “all signatures or purported signatures to the petition…together with all letters of transmittal by which, or in connection with which, such signatures were transported to you or received by you.”

Implicit in Dodd’s demand was the threat of a contempt of Congress charge, an offense that could lead to imprisonment should Pauling fail to comply.  Following the order, the hearing was recessed.

Pauling spoke with the press after finishing his testimony, criticizing the implications of the subcommittee’s requests, and justifying his refusal to turn over the list of signature collectors. Though Pauling had, by and large, met the committee with patience and cooperation, there were a number of issues that had yet to be addressed or accounted for, including several contentious sections of testimony that Pauling wished to read over. The tone of the hearing had turned somewhat sardonic by its end, and Pauling’s indignant interpretation of the proceedings quickly made its way into headlines across the nation.

In the days following his June hearing, Pauling felt that broad national support was building for him generally, but there remained much preparation to complete before his next appearance before the Subcommittee.

The June Hearing, Part 1: Ultimatum Delivered

"Senators Quiz Pauling On Petition Backers," Washington Star, June 21, 1960.

[Part 3 of 5]

“It is well, therefore, to begin with the simple legal profile of what a Committee can and cannot do. All that it can do is to compel a witness to testify. If he talks, and talks honestly, that is the end of the matter. The Committee has no power to deal with him further; it is not adjudicating or determining any of his rights or duties; it is simply collecting information for legislative use. If a witness does not answer honestly, he may expose himself to a perjury prosecution; if he refuses to answer at all, he may expose himself to a contempt prosecution.”

–Harry Kalven, Jr., 1960

Linus Pauling was ordered to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) on June 20, 1960. He and his counsel arrived on time, as requested, at the New Senate Office Building in Washington DC, but the Senate was in session, and Pauling’s hearing was postponed until the following morning. Aside from the inconvenience of delay, Pauling was likewise, that day, notified for the first time that the hearing would be an executive session, and thus not open to the public or the press.

This meant that Pauling would not receive a copy of his testimony, and that the Subcommittee reserved the right to release portions of Pauling’s testimony to the public at their own discretion. The Subcommittee defended their decision by suggesting that “It is consistent practice…for the protection of its witnesses to hold executive sessions in advance of public hearing for the purpose of siting evidence, checking its accuracy and elimination of non-evidential material.”

Though the delay further aggravated his disposition, Pauling made good use of the extra time that was allotted to him, appearing before the press and giving several interviews. He also sent a telegram later that evening to Senator James O. Eastland, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, of which the SISS was a Subcommittee. Pauling voiced his concerns about the closed session, and requested that his hearing be open to the public.

When I appeared this morning as commanded I was surprised to learn for the first time that the session, postponed by you until 8 A.M. tomorrow, is to be an executive hearing closed to the public and the press. I do not like secrecy and I wish to present my testimony in public. I have nothing to say that needs to be kept secret and I neither require nor desire the protection of an executive hearing.

Pauling made it clear that the stated concerns of Senator Thomas J. Dodd and the Subcommittee for keeping the hearing closed – mainly to protect his Pauling’s rights as a witness – were unwarranted. His noisy protests of this decision were treated sympathetically in several prominent newspapers the following morning.

On June 21, after a few minutes of inquiry in executive session, Senator Dodd reversed the earlier decision and opened the hearing to the public. The first moments of the open session were nonetheless used by Dodd to once again justify his initial decision to hold an executive session. After defending himself satisfactorily, and explaining the rationale for Pauling’s presence before the Subcommittee, Dodd made a statement that clarified his fundamental intentions:

…while the particular objective of the session today is to learn what we can from this witness respecting communist activity in connection with protests against nuclear testing, we shall also seek other information respecting communist activity if it appears that such information might be available from this witness.

"Senate Paints Pauling Red -- Or Does It?" The Telegram, March 17, 1961. (Click for full article)

Having established the Subcommittee’s privilege to address the matter, Dodd briefly placated Pauling before moving on with his agenda. It is interesting to note that while the trial is commonly perceived as a battle between Pauling and Senator Dodd, it was Chief Counsel Jules Sourwine who conducted a majority of the questioning during the hearing, allowing Senator Dodd to play a peripheral yet authoritative role.

Chief Counsel Sourwine soon made it clear that the main topic of interest for the hearing was the nuclear test-ban petition that Pauling had submitted to the United Nations more than two years earlier. After reading aloud the press release which had preceded Pauling’s petition submission, Sourwine began asking about the signature collection process that Pauling had utilized in compiling the petitin. The Subcommittee had previously acquired a copy of the petition from the United Nations, and after determining that Pauling had not received each petition signer’s name on separate sheets of paper, Sourwine requested from Pauling the names of those individuals who had collected and turned in more than one signature.

After repeatedly avoiding a direct answer to the request, Pauling was finally forced to fully face the issue. Having cooperated with little reservation up to this point, Pauling politely but firmly refused the request, defending his decision as a matter of conscience and stating that

I feel some concern about my duty to the people who worked for this petition. I feel concern that they may be subpoenaed before this Subcommittee, subjected to the treatment that I have been subjected to.

Senator Dodd justified the request by mentioning discrepancies that his staff had encountered with names that Pauling claimed were on the petition as well as the number of signatures reported by a United Nations staff member. Following the hearing it was determined that responsibility for the error in reporting the total number of petition signatures resided with the U.N., but the allegations during the hearing still served to question Pauling’s penchant for truth.

The Subcommittee then addressed the formation of the petition, the sources of the petition’s funding, and the nature of the roles played by Russian and other international scientists. Chief Counsel Sourwine spent time during the morning hearing’s final portion to discuss Pauling’s questionable affiliations with suspected communists and communist fronts, including the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions and the organization that had printed the petitions.

Finally, as noon approached, Sourwine again requested both a list of individuals that the petition had been sent to and a list of the individuals who had delivered multiple signatures, with an indication of how many signatures were sent in. The hearing was recessed, and Pauling was given a chance to consult with his counsel, Abraham L. Wirin, about how to respond to the Subcommittee’s final requests.

Thomas J. Dodd, Head of the SISS

Thomas J. Dodd, ca. 1950s.

[Part 2 of 5]

“I gladly confess that I recall Tom Dodd as a somehow larger and more appealing figure than his critics acknowledge or the record of the recent past shows. For twelve years I followed him, long enough to leave with me some fond memories and a share in his guilt. Had he been only an empty or venal man, his story would be unimportant. It is what he might have become, had the system through which he rose encouraged his strengths instead of his weaknesses, that gives to his fall an element of tragedy and hence a claim to significance.”

– James Boyd, former staff member and associate

When Linus Pauling was called to appear before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in June 1960, Thomas J. Dodd was the active Subcommittee Chairman.  Pauling’s perception of Dodd was strongly (and understandably) shaped by the unjust position in which he had been placed by the Subcommittee. However the true character and life of Thomas Dodd, as revealed by those who knew him personally, is full of complexity and suggestive of the prevailing practices of U.S. government officials around the middle of the previous century.

Thomas Joseph Dodd was born in Norwich, Connecticut on May 15, 1907. There he attended public schools, and received training in Roman Catholicism throughout most of his childhood. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Providence College, and received a law degree from Yale University in 1933. He married a year later, and eventually raised six children.

Dodd worked at the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a special agent for one year, before being appointed Director of the National Youth Administration for Connecticut. He later served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General, during which time he was best known for his role in the prosecution of Ku Klux Klan members in South Carolina and for defending labor rights in Georgia.

During World War II, Dodd primarily worked on cases involving espionage and sabotage, but also played a role in uncovering fraud by American industrial firms. Following the end of the war, he was solicited to aid in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at the Nuremburg trials in Germany. Active in virtually all aspects of the prosecution, Dodd served as Vice-Chairman of the Review Board and Executive Trial Counsel, essentially making him the second ranking lawyer and supervisor for the U.S. prosecution team.

After returning from Europe, Dodd entered into private practice and was subsequently elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1952 after an unsuccessful run for governor of Connecticut in 1948. Ten years later, in 1958, he was elected to the U.S. Senate, serving on the Judiciary Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As part of his duties he co-chaired the Internal Security Subcommittee, the junction at which he crossed paths with Linus Pauling.

Dodd was known by colleagues for his low level of partisanship, but he was more widely recognized for his stance as a strident anti-communist. (The journalist Drew Pearson referred to him as a “bargain-basement McCarthy.”) His world view was fundamentally inspired by notions of loyalty, and he made a name for himself as one who remained loyal to beleaguered political figures in times of crisis. To his family and those close to him, he was admired for his mirth, humor, generosity and capacity for fellowship, and during his career as a public servant, Senator Dodd often felt he was upholding a strict moral code. Despite his seemingly lofty ideals and persona however, Dodd faltered as he became increasingly intermingled in prevalent and customary forms of political graft.

"Russ Said Developing 'Death Ray,'" Pasadena Star-News, July 11, 1961. (click for entire article)

Though the events that transpired in 1960 with Linus Pauling proved a major event, the time he spent on the SISS was seen by supporters and critics alike as a comparatively minor chapter in his life. He is instead more widely recognized in general both for his notable rise through U.S. institutions, as well as for his misconduct with regard to government ethics violations. His crimes reflected practices that were common in most spheres of state and national politics at the time, and he was reprimanded reluctantly for his transgressions.

After violating flaccid campaign finance laws and abusing government funds, Senator Dodd was involved in a drawn-out congressional inquiry that ended in his censure by the U.S. Senate. Prior to the vote by his peers, a clerk read out the following Censure Resolution:

It is the judgment of the Senate that the Senator from Connecticut, Thomas J. Dodd… deserves the censure of the Senate and he is so censured for his conduct, which is contrary to accepted morals, derogates from the public trust expected of a Senator, and tends to bring the Senate into dishonor and disrepute.

Senator Dodd’s censure, which took place seven years after his confrontation with Linus Pauling, made him the first Senator in U.S. history to be censured for financial misconduct. (He was also the first Senator to be censured since Joseph McCarthy in 1954, and one of only six Senators censured over the whole of the twentieth century.) Though the possibility of criminal investigation from the IRS and Justice Department loomed overhead, Dodd carried on much as though nothing had happened. Ignoring an outcry for his resignation, he remained on his committees and continued to exercise his basic senatorial duties.

Ultimately, the Senate did not pursue any further investigation, instead concluding their formal report with a reprimand aimed at Dodd’s accusers, many of them former staff members. Dodd was allowed to complete his term largely undisturbed, wielding the waning power that remained within his grasp. The censure vote did have lasting effects for the system as a whole however, publicly demonstrating the need for legislative ethics law reform. Reflecting back on the time period, a former aide later an explanation for Dodd’s fraudulent conduct, and the Senate’s hesitant enforcement:

The Senate appeared to Dodd not as a harsh and extracting judge, but as a permissive and protective accomplice. His occasional inanities in debate would always appear in the Record as words of wisdom. His absence would be reported as a presence. His vacation trips would not only be paid for by the Senate, but would be billed as ‘official business.’ His honorariums and legal kickbacks and finder fees and gifts were excused from the prohibitions that covered all government officials except Congressmen and Senators. His fraudulent campaign reports would always be accepted at face value. Not only could he keep unsavory contributions, he could route them through the Senate Campaign Committee and thus hide their origin. He could use his official allowances to buy birthday presents, wedding invitations, and the like, and no one would know. He had reason to consider himself immune from investigation.

Spurned by the Democratic Party, Dodd lost in his bid to run as an Independent in the 1970 Senate re-election campaign.  Less than one year later, on May 24, 1971, he fell victim to a heart attack, dying in his home at the age of 64.

The SISS Ordeal: Background to a Trying Time

Pauling testifies before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 1960.

[Ed Note: June 21, 2010 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Pauling’s first appearance before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.  We are marking the occasion with a five-part series that tells the story of this important and traumatic experience.]

[Part 1 of 5]

In 1956 and 1957, Linus Pauling helped organize a petition which protested against above-ground nuclear bomb testing by the world’s nuclear powers. The project was first endorsed only by American scientists, but became an international appeal shortly after the completion of a robust initial release.

Though many found the display inspirational, others questioned the petition’s motives and organization. Pauling was not alone in crafting the document, but much of both the praise and the criticism that it generated was directed at him. The petition remained a contentious issue into the following decade, as Pauling became entangled with members of the United States Senate over questions concerning the petition’s distribution.

As was the standard for him after World War II, Linus Pauling was kept busy in the late 1950s by a frenzied mixture of research, public speaking and social demonstration. He remained actively engaged in academia, but was directing more and more attention to nuclear non-proliferation issues.

Pauling’s main concern at the time was the tepid response from public officials and the Atomic Energy Commission to what he viewed to be a major problem – radioactive fallout from atomic bomb detonations. After conferring with two scientific colleagues, Barry Commoner and Edward Condon, it was concluded that, because of their insight and technical knowledge of the dangers involved, the nation’s scientists bore a special responsibility to speak out about nuclear testing.

As a result, Pauling and several associates began circulating a petition. Copies were distributed to individual scientists across several states, and soon large swaths of scientists from several universities and institutions began responding en masse. The petition’s purpose was made very clear from the outset of its introduction:

We, the American scientists whose names are signed below, urge that an international agreement to stop the testing of nuclear bombs be made now.

The initial document, “Appeal by American Scientists to the Government and Peoples of the World,” came back to Pauling adorned with over two-thousand signatures, including those of several prominent members of the scientific community. After a short interlude, the petition was supplemented by an international version, ultimately raising the total to a tally of more than 13,000 signatures.

The endeavor was seen as a huge success by advocates, but it also instigated a new movement against Pauling, one propelled by several public agencies and officials. In particular, the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) began focusing more attention on Pauling, though it was not the first time he had found a place on their agenda. In 1955 the SISS released a tract titled “The Communist Party of the United States of America: What It Is, and How It Works.” Linus Pauling’s name was on a list of individuals said to be among the most active participants and supporters of communist fronts.

Similarly, when Pauling and his associates released their nuclear test ban petition in June 1957, they were met with substantial criticism from a wide variety of opinion makers. Initially Pauling’s scientific authority on the issue was the primary in question. Soon enough though, Pauling was being accused of communist conspiracy, and was subpoenaed by the SISS to discuss the potential role of communist organizations in the petition’s distribution. Pauling expressed his willingness to appear before the subcommittee, but unforeseen senatorial politics eventually interceded, forcing a temporary delay of his compulsory appearance in Washington, DC.

The SISS itself was essentially the Senate version of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), having served similar purposes in the past. Indeed, in 1960 the committee was composed of many staff members recycled from past HUAC activities. Most notably, Senator Thomas Dodd, chairman of the Subcommittee at the time, conferred regularly with former HUAC investigator Benjamin Mandel. Senator Dodd and others were also working periodically with the FBI in a joint effort against suspected communist subversion.

Before they refocused on Pauling, Dodd and the SISS were popularly credited with instigating the dissolution of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), a collection of locally oriented anti-bomb protest groups. Dodd worked discretely with SANE’s national leadership in providing the organization with an ultimatum:  either cull itself of alleged communist membership or risk a prolonged investigation by federal authorities. SANE’s leadership chose to impose loyalty oaths, a move that split the entire organization, leaving the severed parts largely incapacitated. After the subcommittee’s apparent victory, Dodd and his counsel were emboldened enough to focus their full attentions on Pauling.

Following a speech given to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in the spring of 1960, Pauling was handed several fliers, a poem, some news clippings and other random papers while answering people’s questions. That night, after returning to his hotel room, he found a subpoena addressed to him within the clutter.

Subpeona issued to Linus Pauling by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate. June 20, 1960.

The subpoena adjured his appearance before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on June 21st, two days from then, to address:

Communist participation in, or support of, propaganda campaign against nuclear testing, and other Communist or Communist-front activity with respect to which you [Pauling] may have knowledge.

Abraham Lincoln Wirin, a lawyer who had helped Pauling through an earlier dispute, flew directly to Washington, DC the next day. The duo discussed Pauling’s options and decided to utilize the press as much as possible, a tactic that had proven fruitful for Pauling in the past. Though Pauling was given very short notice, he and Wirin were able to devise what seemed to be a simple but promising broader strategy. They decided to make the entire affair as public as possible, cooperate to whatever extent was appropriate, and maintain the integrity of Pauling’s constitutional rights. Though he was alarmed, Pauling felt reasonably prepared for the engagement ahead of him.